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•	 The Bank of Canada’s annual conference, held 
in October 2010, brought together leading re­
searchers from universities and central banks 
around the world to discuss the issue of Financial 
Globalization and Financial Instability. The confer­
ence covered such topics as the effects of finan­
cial globalization on risk, liquidity, and asset prices, 
the causes of crises and their effects, and appro­
priate regulatory responses.
T
he trend over the past few decades has been 
towards greater financial globalization. In other 
words, the ties between the economies of dif-
ferent countries have grown stronger over time as 
markets for goods and services, as well as those for 
financial assets, have been liberalized to greater trade. 
Cross-border financial flows have increased tremen-
dously, bringing with them benefits in terms of growth 
from new investment and export opportunities, as well 
as potential costs in terms of increased uncertainty, 
financial market volatility, and possibly even a greater 
probability and size of crises. The characteristics and 
size of the overall net benefits from this process are 
still the subject of much debate.
The conference was divided into six sessions plus a 
keynote address and a panel discussion. The 
remainder of this article briefly summarizes these 
papers and discussions.
Session 1: Financial Globalization 
and Risk
There has been strong trend growth in cross-border 
financial flows among industrial economies and 
between industrial and emerging-market economies. 
At the same time, economists have been debating the 
benefits and costs of such financial globalization. 
Some economists believe that unfettered capital flows 
pose a serious impediment to global financial stability. 
Others argue that increased openness to capital flows 
has proven essential for economic growth and for the 
development of financial markets in emerging-market 
economies, while significantly enhancing stability 
among industrialized countries. The two papers in this 
session further advance this debate.
Charles A. Trzcinka and Andrey D. Ukhov (Indiana 
University) examine both the costs and benefits asso-
ciated with financial globalization and risk sharing. 
*  I would like to thank Greg Bauer, Antonio Diez de los Rios, Koralai Kirabaeva, Sermin 
Gungor, Teodora Paligorova, Jesus Sierra, and Jun Yang for putting together an excellent 
conference and for their input to this article.
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heterogeneous agents to endogenously choose 
whether to participate in financial markets. The paper 
studies the welfare effects of opening markets to 
foreigners, using a framework that models the 
opposing economic forces that affect decision 
making in an economy as it is opened to foreign 
investment. As is the case with other research on 
asset pricing in a multicountry model, it demonstrates 
that financial globalization generally reduces a coun-
try’s cost of capital. In contrast to previous models, 
however, motives to trade and participate are 
endogenous, and the authors are able to compute the 
change in welfare of the domestic agents. The model 
shows that the decision to open markets affects risk-
sharing arrangements in the economy and asset 
prices, as well as the welfare of agents. The removal 
of barriers changes the distribution across different 
types of investors, causing prices and the cost of 
capital to change. It may also make it more expensive 
for some domestic agents to participate in the risk-
sharing offered by risky domestic assets and will lead 
to a decrease in their welfare. Contrary to previous 
models, their model shows that opening markets is 
not Pareto optimal: the welfare of certain domestic 
agents, particularly demanders of risky assets, may 
be lower after the opening of markets.
The findings have political-economy interpretations 
and policy implications. Investment barriers may 
enhance a country’s welfare, and the decision to 
maintain such barriers may be an endogenous, 
rational economic decision and not the result of 
agency costs or political failure. The argument for 
liberalization may be refined by identifying the set of 
agents who find risk sharing attractive after markets 
are opened. The timing of liberalization is not random, 
and it depends on endowments, prices, and risk 
exposure. The model also provides a rational explana-
tion for the historical evidence of liberalization and the 
reversals of liberalization found by previous studies.
Gianni De Nicolò (International monetary Fund) 
and Luciana Juvenal (Federal reserve bank of 
St. louis) use data for a large number of advanced 
and emerging-market economies from 1985 to 2009 
to investigate the real effects of financial integration 
on economic growth. First, the authors document the 
dynamics of financial integration. Strong evidence is 
given of a declining trend in the cross-country disper-
sion of equity premiums, which indicates increased 
integration in international financial markets. This 
result is driven primarily by increases in the financial 
integration of emerging economies. Second, the 
authors investigate the relation between financial 
integration and economic growth. new measures are 
constructed for the level of financial integration and 
“risk-adjusted” growth opportunities. The measure of 
financial integration is given by the difference between 
a country’s equity premium and that of the group 
average at each date. The measure of “risk-adjusted” 
growth opportunities is a Sharpe ratio-type measure
1 
of the market price-to-earnings (Pe) ratio relative to 
the global Pe ratio. The paper tests whether financial 
integration predicts “risk-adjusted” growth opportun-
ities, as well as the converse, both at the global and 
regional levels with monthly data. Increases in financial 
integration are found to robustly and significantly 
predict better growth opportunities, while “risk-
adjusted” growth opportunities do not necessarily 
predict advances in financial integration.
The authors also examine the predictive impact of 
financial integration on actual growth and on a proxy 
of growth volatility, using annual data. They find that 
advances in financial integration predict higher 
growth, lower growth volatility, and lower probabilities 
of systemic real risk for equity markets. Three indirect 
channels through which financial integration may 
foster economic growth are explored. Financial integra-
tion is found to foster domestic financial development 
and the liquidity of equity markets. Finally, they find 
that better-quality institutions and corporate govern-
ance are associated with higher levels of financial 
integration. each of these effects promotes economic 
growth over the long term.
Session 2: Liquidity
liquidity in financial markets is important for the stability 
and efficiency of the financial system. Sudden and 
extreme shifts in market liquidity may create a channel 
through which contagion can grow and propagate 
systemic risk throughout the economy. The two 
papers in this section analyze the contributing role of 
liquidity shocks to financial fragility.
Maya Eden (mIT) studies how financial integration 
between emerging and developed economies affects 
the global distribution of output volatility. She presents 
a model that explains why shocks to external funding 
are an important source of crises in emerging markets 
but are typically irrelevant in developed countries. The 
paper proposes a novel link, based on the interaction 
between financial distortions and the process of 
1  The Sharpe ratio compares a portfolio’s return to a risk-free return, and then scales the 
result by the variance of the portfolio’s return. The higher the Sharpe ratio, the better is 
the portfolio’s return, given the amount of risk taken.
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between the vulnerability of emerging economies to 
shocks to external funding and the moderation of 
liquidity-driven fluctuations in output in the developed 
world prior to the recent crisis. The model also gener-
ates volatility patterns that are consistent with the 
amplification of the subprime-mortgage crisis. In par-
ticular, it suggests that financial integration between 
developed and emerging economies may have led to 
endogenous structural changes in the financial system 
that set the stage for the crisis. These structural 
changes include the loosening of lending standards, 
increased securitization, and increased reliance on 
securitized products in banks’ balance sheets.
Koralai Kirabaeva (bank of Canada) studies the 
interaction between adverse selection, liquidity risk, 
and beliefs about systemic risk in determining market 
liquidity, asset prices, and welfare. The paper charac-
terizes the portfolio choices of financial institutions 
between safe and risky assets when systemic risk is 
anticipated, and examines how investors’ beliefs may 
contribute to market freezes. In the presence of infor-
mation and liquidity frictions, financial institutions do 
not fully internalize the impacts of their actions on 
market liquidity and overinvest in risky, illiquid assets, 
which creates systemic externalities. The paper illus-
trates how even a small amount of adverse selection 
in the asset market can lead to fire-sale pricing and, 
possibly, to a market breakdown if it is accompanied 
by a flight to liquidity, an underestimation of systemic 
risk, or uncertainty about asset values. The paper 
further explores the effectiveness of possible policy 
responses, such as liquidity provision and purchases 
of low-quality assets, as well as an ex-ante requirement 
of larger liquidity holdings.
Session 3: Securitization and 
Capital Flows
volatile capital inflows played an important role in 
aggravating the recent financial crises. The two 
papers in this section examine how such capital 
inflows affected housing markets and yields on U.S. 
Treasury bonds.
Filipa Sá (University of Cambridge), Pascal Towbin 
(banque de France), and Tomasz Wieladek (bank of 
england) examine the effects of capital inflows, mon-
etary policy, and financial innovation on housing 
market activity. The study is motivated by recent 
discussions on how these factors affect housing 
markets.
One argument highlighted in the paper is that expan-
sionary monetary policy has kept interest rates low, 
which has fuelled the demand for housing. Others 
attribute the growth in the housing market to global 
imbalances—countries with excessive savings and 
underdeveloped capital markets invest in countries 
with developed capital markets and thus depress the 
price of credit in the latter. It is also believed that 
interest rate changes have a much stronger impact on 
housing activity in countries with high consumer 
leverage and active securitized markets.
Using data for 18 OeCd countries from 1984 to 2007, 
the study offers several results. Capital inflows and 
monetary policy shocks have a significant positive 
effect on real credit to the private sector, real house 
prices, and residential investment. These housing 
variables are more sensitive to shocks in countries 
with a developed mortgage market. The authors 
reason that in these countries, households can pledge 
a larger fraction of their house’s value as collateral 
and increase their leverage, which makes them more 
sensitive to changes in the value of that collateral. 
Another finding is that the response of housing 
activity to capital inflows is larger and lasts longer in 
countries with developed mortgage markets.
The results provide input to the debate on global 
  imbalances as a contributing factor to the crisis. Capital 
inflows to countries with developed mortgage markets 
expose their housing sector to capital-inflow shocks.
Carol Bertaut, Laurie Pounder DeMarco, 
Steve Kamin, and Ralph Tryon (board of Governors 
of the Federal reserve System) study the role played 
by inflows of international capital to the United States 
in the financial crisis. The authors document that 
foreign flows into corporate debt—including asset-
backed securities (AbS)—were as large as those into 
U.S. Treasury bills and U.S. Agency securities. Inflows 
from emerging Asia and the middle east were primarily 
in the form of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies, while 
inflows from europe were in the form of corporate 
debt and AbS. The non-european countries financed 
their investments through current account surpluses, 
while the european countries expanded their external 
liabilities.
The paper argues that global investors in U.S. 
Treasuries pushed down yields on safe assets to such 
an extent that the appetite for riskier assets in general, 
and for subprime mortgages in particular, was greatly 
increased. On the other hand, foreign investors’ 
demand for risky assets contributed to the decline in 
the interest rates on AbS relative to those on safe 
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of AbS, thereby directly increasing the flow of 
resources to subprime and other risky borrowers.
Using a calibrated portfolio-balance model, the 
authors show that inflows from non-european countries 
suppressed the yields on U.S. Treasury bills. Foreign 
purchases of AbS, mainly by european investors, 
pushed down the yield spreads on the mortgages 
underlying these securities.
Session 4: Regulatory Responses
Historical evidence proves that financial systems are 
prone to periods of instability. The global financial 
crisis that began in mid-2007 has highlighted the 
ongoing debate about designing new and more 
effective financial regulation and supervision. The two 
papers in this session examine optimal regulatory 
policies in order to prevent future crises.
Javier Bianchi (University of maryland) and 
Enrique G. Mendoza (University of maryland and 
nber) examine overborrowing
2 and financial crises in 
an equilibrium model with collateral constraints. The 
authors focus on the comparison of the allocations 
and welfare attained by private agents facing collateral 
constraints in a decentralized competitive equilibrium 
with those attained by a social planner subject to the 
same constraints. The private agents take the price of 
their collateral assets as given. As a result, a “credit 
externality” arises because they do not internalize the 
effects of their individual borrowing plans on the 
market price of collateral and on the wage costs 
  relevant for working capital. On the other hand, the 
constrained social planner internalizes these effects 
and takes into account how current borrowing 
choices affect future asset prices and wages.
Although the credit externality results in only a small 
overborrowing compared with the constrained- 
efficient allocations of the social planner, it produces 
financial crises that are significantly more severe and 
more frequent than in the constrained-efficient equi-
librium, and produces higher variability in the busi-
ness cycle in the long run. The credit externality also 
produces excess returns on assets, Sharpe ratios, 
and market prices of risk that are much larger than in 
the constrained-efficient equilibrium. The authors 
suggest the introduction of an optimal schedule of 
2  Overborrowing is defined as the difference between the amount of credit that an agent 
obtains acting individually in an environment with a given set of credit frictions, and the 
amount obtained by a social planner who faces the same frictions but internalizes the 
general-equilibrium effects of its borrowing decisions. 
state-contingent taxes on debt and dividends. In 
other words, the policy implication of their model is a 
tax on debt and dividends that should be higher in 
bad times, i.e., when the economy is building up 
leverage and becoming vulnerable to a financial crisis, 
but before a crisis actually occurs, and lower in good 
times. This is to induce private agents to value the 
accumulation of savings more than they do in the 
competitive equilibrium without taxes.
The second paper in this session by Alan D. Morrison 
(University of Oxford and CePr) and Lucy White 
(Harvard business School and CePr) sheds light on 
the optimal regulation of the financial system by a 
common regulator in order to reduce the risk of inter-
bank contagion. The authors demonstrate that the 
reputation of the common regulator can be a cause of 
financial contagion, and, therefore, it may be socially 
desirable that regulators engage in ex post “reputa-
tion management.” Such management can be 
achieved through private or public policies, depending 
on the regulator’s initial reputation.
In their model, the failure of one bank can undermine 
the public’s confidence in the competence of the 
banking regulator and, hence, in other banks char-
tered by the same regulator. Thus, depositors may 
withdraw funds from the other banks, even when the 
returns on the assets in which those banks invest are 
uncorrelated and there is no interbank lending. Under 
these panic circumstances, it can be optimal for the 
regulator to exercise forbearance privately towards a 
failing bank in order to conserve its own reputation 
and hope that the bank—and, hence, other vulnerable 
banks—survives. In contrast, public bailouts are 
ineffective in preventing panics because they do not 
conserve the regulator’s reputation ex post. Therefore, 
when forbearance is public, it may need to be supple-
mented by additional and costly measures, such as 
increased deposit insurance. whether transparency 
or privacy is optimal ex ante depends on the regula-
tor’s initial reputation and the likely size of shocks to 
its reputation. regulatory transparency improves 
confidence ex ante but impedes the regulator’s ability 
to stem panics ex post. Hence, privacy and discretion 
may be socially preferable for regulators with strong 
reputations; however, transparency is essential if the 
regulator’s reputation is initially very poor. 
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Returns
The global 2007–09 crisis has provided a clear illustra-
tion for the existence of “economic disasters” and the 
impact of such rare events on the returns obtained by 
international investors. Along these lines, barro (2006) 
finds that, despite being low-probability events, such 
economic disasters can have a large impact on 
expected returns and can even explain asset-pricing 
puzzles, such as the equity premium. The papers in 
this session address whether the risks of global eco-
nomic disaster can also explain international asset-
pricing puzzles, such as uncovered interest rate parity.
François Gourio (boston University), Michael Siemer 
(boston University), and Adrien Verdelhan (mIT) 
develop a rich two-country model of the real business 
cycle with a small, yet time-varying, risk of a global 
economic disaster (i.e., a large drop in global con-
sumption) and where countries differ in their exposure 
to this global risk. The authors find that changes in the 
probability of a worldwide disaster lead not only to 
variations in risk premiums, but also induce variability 
in macroeconomic quantities. In particular, as the 
probability of a disaster increases, investment 
becomes less attractive, and thus investment and 
output fall. On the other hand, demand for pre-
cautionary savings increases, leading to a drop in the 
interest rates on risk-free assets, while yield spreads 
on risky assets increase. For this reason, capital is 
pulled out of the riskier country, which experiences 
the largest recession, as investors seek safety. The 
model also rationalizes the risk premium on carry 
trade because, in their setup, the currency with high 
interest rates depreciates when global risk increases.
Alexandre Jeanneret (HeC montréal) develops and 
calibrates to U.S. data a two-country general-equilibrium 
model with international trade, where the default 
decisions of firms and governments are endogenous. 
In his model, a negative economic shock in the foreign 
country deteriorates the fiscal position of the foreign 
government and increases the risk of a sovereign 
default abroad and of a contraction in economic 
growth in the domestic country. Thus, an increase in 
sovereign risk reduces the expected value of future 
export revenues for U.S. firms through a depreciation 
of the terms of trade and triggers an incentive for 
portfolio rebalancing towards the risk-free bond, thus 
depressing equity prices in both countries. The risk of 
a contraction in economic growth abroad amplifies, 
through these two channels, the initial fall in the equity 
values of U.S. firms and thus the rise in volatility of 
equity returns in the United States.
Session 6: Global Imbalances and 
Asset-Price Dynamics
Global imbalances have been cited as a possible 
cause of the recent financial crisis, since it is believed 
that they may have contributed to the decrease in 
interest rates that, in turn, increased the risk-taking 
behaviour of market participants. However, empirical 
evidence of a significant impact on the prices of 
domestic assets from foreign purchases of net assets 
is still inconclusive. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that changes in asset prices may have led to capital 
movements; in fact, at the aggregate level, a country’s 
net foreign asset position necessarily embeds expect-
ations about future asset prices. The papers in this 
session attempt to shed some light on the causal 
relationship between asset prices and international 
capital flows.
Jesus Sierra (bank of Canada) studies the impact of 
international capital flows on interest rates through 
risk premiums. Interest rates contain two components: 
expectations of future short-term rates and expected 
excess returns (risk premiums). Given that the central 
bank does not set its policy rate in response to foreign 
purchases of long-term bonds, any impact of capital 
flows on interest rates must take place through risk 
premiums. If we assume rational expectations, this 
suggests that the impact of capital flows on asset 
prices could be measured by calculating the correlation 
between future realized excess returns and current 
flows. Inflows of funds by foreign official institutions 
have a negative and non-linear impact on risk pre-
miums and thus appear similar to relative supply 
shocks, while private net purchases, with a positive 
and linear effect, absorb excess supply and are thus 
compensated in equilibrium for this service. The 
results do not support the view that international 
capital flows were among the main drivers of the 
decrease in long-term U.S. rates from 1994 to 2007.
In the second paper in this session, Martin D. D. Evans 
and Alberto Fuertes (Georgetown University) 
examine the channels through which the net external 
asset position of the United States deteriorated over 
the past 35 years. They find that most of the quarter-
by-quarter changes in the U.S. external position 
between 1973 and 2008 are due to news (shocks) 
about future returns and trade flows, with news about 
future returns dominating news about future trade 
flows. Over long horizons, however, the changes 
reflect prior expectations about how the United States 
would meet its international financial obligations. Their 
results suggest that only through both favourable 
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pluses will the United States be able to return to an 
external balance and that this process could take over 
13 years and involve a significant real depreciation of 
the dollar.
John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture
Eswar Prasad (Cornell University and brookings 
Institution) delivered the conference’s keynote speech. 
He discussed how globalization created channels for 
the cross-country spillover of shocks, and examined 
the implications and future prospects of global imbal-
ances. The speech covered lessons and challenges 
for monetary policy in an integrated world economy 
with open capital accounts. In particular, he discussed 
the scope of a central bank’s objectives, including 
whether and how asset prices might be incorporated 
into the monetary policy framework, and what the 
optimal degree of central bank independence is. 
Some potential research topics arising from these 
issues were also outlined. For example, he called for 
further exploration of the connections between price 
stability and financial stability, and for the development 
of more robust monetary policy frameworks that 
address challenges faced by emerging markets in the 
post-crisis world.
Panel Discussion: Whither 
Financial Globalization?
The conference concluded with a discussion of the 
future prospects for financial globalization by a panel 
consisting of Timothy Lane (bank of Canada), 
Stanley Zin (new york University), and Martin Evans 
(Georgetown University).
Timothy Lane led off the discussion with a brief 
review of some of the costs and benefits of financial 
globalization and of recent financial crises that have 
hit the global economy. In advanced economies, 
financial globalization was not seen as a real problem 
until recently, and the probability of a crisis was 
thought to be remote. There was a much larger con-
cern that financial globalization could cause problems 
in emerging-market economies by making macro-
economic management much more difficult. In the 
wake of the Asian crisis, there was only weak evidence 
that liberalization was good for growth. The most 
recent global financial crisis largely reflected a com-
bination of macroeconomic imbalances, a search for 
yield, and pervasive weaknesses in the financial systems 
of many countries. In the wake of the crisis, some are 
arguing that global capital flows should be limited, but 
international efforts are instead focused on making 
the global financial system more robust. Financial 
reform is under way on capital regulation, infrastructure, 
resolution policies, and system-wide prudential policies. 
These efforts need to promote information sharing in 
the regulation of globalized financial institutions and to 
monitor the risks possible from regulatory arbitrage. 
There is a risk that regulation could become a source 
of financial protectionism going forward, but inter-
national efforts are under way to counter this risk and 
allow globalization to promote growth.
Stanley Zin expressed the belief that the trend 
towards financial globalization will continue strongly 
into the future and will not be derailed by any regula-
tory changes because the underlying forces promo-
ting it are simply too strong. One of the most 
important driving factors that he cited was demo-
graphic imbalances (e.g., an aging population and 
global population distribution). Financial assets are 
designed to move capital across time, space, and 
generations, all of which will support financial flows 
going forward. zin then went on to discuss some 
ideas on how we should structure global financial 
markets. He argued there is a strong need for inter-
national coordination of regulatory initiatives and that 
there should be a preference for rules versus discre-
tion in the design of policy. rules are more appro-
priate for keeping regulators from being co-opted by 
business and for maintaining a stable environment. 
Solid regulation should be built and then maintained 
so that, going forward, decisions can be made with 
more certainty with respect to the financial 
environment.
Martin Evans also expressed the opinion that financial 
globalization will continue unabated because of strong 
underlying drivers, such as demographic trends, con-
tinuing advancements in telecommunications, and the 
difficulty in coordinating international regulatory efforts 
(which creates large opportunities for regulatory arbi-
trage). He went on to discuss some of the gaps in our 
knowledge that need to be addressed by researchers. 
For example, he called for extensive work on the links 
between the fields of finance and macroeconomics. 
Our macroeconomic models need to incorporate more 
detail on how financial markets function, the roles of 
market-makers and heterogeneous agents, and the 
nature of information problems. This combination of 
macroeconomic and financial factors is required for the 
design of optimal regulatory policy.
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